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Abstract  
The aims of this fMRI study were two-fold. The first objective of the study was to 
verify whether the findings associated with a previous fMRI study could be replicated 
in which a novel event-related experimental design was developed which rendered it 
possible to investigate the brain basis of creative conceptual expansion. The ability to 
widen the boundaries of conceptual structures is integral to creative idea generation, 
which makes conceptual expansion a core component of creative cognition. Creative 
conceptual expansion led to the engagement of brain regions that are known to be 
involved in the access, storage and relational integration of conceptual knowledge in 
the original study. These included the anterior inferior frontal gyrus, the temporal poles 
and the lateral frontal pole. These findings in relation to the brain basis of creative 
conceptual expansion were replicated in the current study. The second objective of this 
study was to evaluate the brain basis of individual differences in creative conceptual 
expansion. The high creative group relative to the low creative group was shown to 
exhibit greater activity in regions of the semantic cognition network as well as the 
salience network during creative conceptual expansion. The findings are discussed 
from the point of view of classical hypotheses about information processing biases that 
explain individual differences in creativity including flat associative hierarchies, 
defocused attention and cognitive disinhibition.  
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The neuroscience of creativity is a rapidly advancing field with wide-ranging approaches that 
can be adopted to understand the neural underpinnings of the creative mind. The approaches 
can generally be classified as global or local in their focus (Abraham, 2018). ‘Global’ 
approaches seek to explain creativity in terms of large-scale brain networks and mechanisms 
(Abraham, 2014; Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016). The most dominant 
contemporary idea within global approaches is that creativity is subserved by the dual 
workings of two brain networks, namely the default mode network (DMN) and the central 
executive brain network (CEN). The DMN is engaged during contexts of internal mentation 
and spontaneous cognition (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Raichle, 2015) whereas the CEN is engaged during goal-
directed cognition (Cole & Schneider, 2007; Niendam et al., 2012; Robbins, 2007). In the 
context of creativity, the DMN is held to be involved in the generation of idea variants via 
divergent aspects of creative thinking whereas the CEN is held to be involved in selection of 
idea variations by means of convergent aspects of creativity (Beaty, Benedek, Kaufman, & 
Silvia, 2015; Jung, Mead, Carrasco, & Flores, 2013).  
 
The alternative ‘local’ approach is to examine the different cognitive operations involved in 
creativity and their mechanisms. Relevant cognitive operations that have been studied in 
relation to creativity include analogical reasoning (Green, 2016), metaphor processing 
(Benedek et al., 2014), improvisation (Limb & Braun, 2008), insight (Kounios & Beeman, 
2009) and conceptual expansion (Abraham, Pieritz, et al., 2012). Following the local 
approach allows one to determine the differential influence exerted by myriad brain regions 
within large brain networks on various aspects of creative cognition. For instance, the 
function of lateral aspects of frontal pole (Brodmann area 10, also known as anterior 
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prefrontal cortex, rostral prefrontal cortex or frontopolar cortex) in analogical reasoning 
(Green, 2016; Hobeika, Diard-Detoeuf, Garcin, Levy, & Volle, 2016) has been made based 
on extensive evidence showing the engagement of this region in relational reasoning and 
relational integration. This has been evidenced in the conceptual domain when deriving an 
association between semantically distant concepts (Wendelken, Nakhabenko, Donohue, 
Carter, & Bunge, 2008) as well during abstract reasoning (Christoff et al., 2001). 
Neuropsychological evidence also points to the utility and validity of the local approach. For 
instance, while patients with lesions of the basal ganglia displayed poorer performance on 
select aspects of creative cognition, such as practicality in creative imagery, they performed 
better than healthy matched control participants on the ability to overcome the constraining 
influence of salient examples during creative idea generation. Patients with parieto-temporal 
lesions, on the other hand, performed worse on both these aspects of creative cognition 
(Abraham, Beudt, Ott, & von Cramon, 2012).  
 
The current study is a replication and extension study that follows the local approach in 
examining conceptual expansion during creative thinking, which refers to the capacity to 
widen our conceptual knowledge structures (Ward, 1994). This cognitive operation is central 
to creative idea generation, as originality derives from the alteration of existing concepts to 
feature novel elements (Abraham & Windmann, 2007; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1996). In a 
previous fMRI study (Abraham, Pieritz, et al., 2012), the neural correlates of creative 
conceptual expansion was uncovered by contrasting a highly cognitively demanding 
divergent thinking task (the alternate uses task) with a less cognitively demanding divergent 
thinking task (the object location task), where the brain activity patterns that were associated 
with high cognitive demand (2-back working memory task) were partialled out. The inclusion 
of a non-divergent control task was to rule out the possibility that the resulting brain activity 
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patterns when contrasting divergent thinking tasks was mainly attributable to the differences 
in cognitive demand, a severe problem that was associated with neuroimaging studies of 
creativity at the time (Abraham, 2013). The pattern of findings revealed that creative 
conceptual expansion was associated with heightened brain activity in anterior aspects of the 
lateral inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45 and 47), temporal pole (BA 38) and lateral anterior 
prefrontal cortex (BA 10).  
 
The aims of the current study are two-fold. The first objective is to verify whether the 
original brain imaging findings in relation to creative conceptual expansion can be replicated. 
This is of paramount importance given the current replication crisis in research within 
psychology and neuroscience (Gilmore, Diaz, Wyble, & Yarkoni, 2017; Maxwell, Lau, & 
Howard, 2015). The second objective is to test for the neural correlates of individual 
differences in conceptual expansion. While much of the empirical literature in relation to the 
neuroscience of creativity is directed at uncovering the brain correlates of creative cognition 
(e.g., Abraham, Beudt, et al., 2012) and the brain correlates of individual differences in 
creative cognition (e.g., Zabelina, Saporta, & Beeman, 2016), there are few contemporary 
theoretical models that have been proposed to explain the brain basis of individual 
differences in creative cognition. Three classical formulations of information processing 
biases that were held to typify highly creative individuals were flat associative hierarchies 
(Mednick, 1962), defocused attention (Mendelsohn, 1974) and cognitive disinhibition 
(Martindale, 2007). Each of these will be explored briefly and proposals will be put forward 
in relation to their putative brain basis.  
 
According to Mednick (1962), the very structure of the associative hierarchies within the 
semantic knowledge networks of highly creative people differ from those of less creative 
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people with regard to the strengths of the connections between concepts in long-term 
memory. Less creative individuals are regarded as having steep associative hierarchies in that 
the activation of one concept (e.g., milk) prompts the activation of mainly closely associated 
concepts (e.g., white, tea), which in turn points to a steep search space within a narrow set of 
semantic categories (e.g., color, beverage). Highly creative people, on the other hand, have 
flat associative hierarchies as the activation of one concept also activates weakly associated 
concepts (e.g., exploit). Evidence for this seminal theoretical idea in creativity stems from 
studies of behavioral performance on word association paradigms and the remote associates 
test (RAT) (Mednick, 1962).  
 
In contrast, Mendelsohn (1974) held that the type of attentional control that was exerted when 
accessing conceptual knowledge was critical in explaining individual differences in 
creativity. Here, the degree of widening or focus of the attentional stream has a direct impact 
on creative ideation. This is because the higher the number of elements within one’s 
attentional stream, the higher the number of resulting combinations between those elements. 
As highly creative people are characterized by defocused attention or wider attentional focus, 
they would have more elements within their stream of consciousness and consequently the 
higher potential to generate more unusual ideas by combining the elements present within 
their attentional stream. Finally, Martindale’s (2007) ideas on individual differences in 
creativity stemmed from his views on the ‘conceptual-primordial cognition continuum’ 
where goal-directed, rational and reality-oriented states of mind occupy one end of the 
continuum while primordial and undirected states, such as fantasy and dreaming, occupy the 
other end of the continuum. An inverted-U function was held to promote creativity such that 
intermediate levels of disinhibition, as occurs during daydreaming and is marked by flexible, 
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associative and open-ended cogitation, are associated with enhanced creativity compared to 
extreme primordial cognition (dreaming) or conceptual cognition (externally guided action).  
 
The central rationale across all three views is that as having a flat associative hierarchy or 
defocused attention or cognitive disinhibition allows for access to more remotely associated 
concepts, it increases the likelihood of the generation of more unusual and original ideas. As 
Mednick’s views implicate the organization of semantic knowledge as underpinning 
differences in creative cognition, relevant regions of the semantic cognition brain network 
(Binder & Desai, 2011) would be the brain basis of individual differences in creativity, such 
as the temporal pole, which is widely viewed as the semantic hub of the brain (Patterson, 
Nestor, & Rogers, 2007), and the posterior middle temporal gyrus, which is involved in the 
access and storage of conceptual knowledge (Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008). As 
Mendelsohn’s views implicate the access and manipulation of conceptual knowledge, regions 
of the semantic cognition network that are involved in the retrieval of semantic information 
such as aforementioned the posterior middle temporal gyrus (Lau et al., 2008) and the lateral 
inferior frontal gyrus (Badre & Wagner, 2007) would be expected to be involved, as well as 
regions relevant for working memory such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (du 
Boisgueheneuc et al., 2006). Finally, as Martindale’s views implicate inhibitory control, 
regions of the CEN such as the basal ganglia and the right inferior frontal gyrus would be 
implicated in the same (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014; Hampshire & Sharp, 2015; Schall, 
Palmeri, & Logan, 2017). Although the experimental paradigm is not designed to provide a 
clear test between these theories, exploring the differences in the brain activity patterns 
between highly creative and less creative individuals during creative conceptual expansion 
will provide crucial evidence that aids us in estimating which of these theories receives 
indirect support from the data.  Please note that the idea to follow this kind of approach has 
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its roots in a previous review which featured in a Special Issue on Methods in Creativity 





A large sample of female university students at the Justus Liebig University of Giessen in 
Germany (n = 110) completed five trials (2 minutes per trial) of the alternate uses task (AUT) 
– brick, newspaper, bottle, tyre, and umbrella – as well as the vocabulary scale of the 
Hamburg Wechsler Intelligence Test for Adults (HAWIE: Tewes, 1994). The HAWIE 
vocabulary scale involves the experimenter reading aloud 32 words with increasing difficulty 
to the participant. Upon hearing each word, the participant’s task is to provide a brief 
definition of each word. The number of correctly defined words is transformed into a 
standardized value, which takes the participant’s age into consideration, thereby giving a 
measure of intellectual ability (WST IQ).  
 
After excluding participants who had an average AUT ideational fluency score of < 3 (n = 8), 
this pre-fMRI screening sample (Age: Mean = 22.66, SD = 2.88) was divided into high 
creative, medium creative and low creative groups based on their ideational originality index 
(for AUT fluency and originality scoring procedures: see ‘Experimental Tasks: Divergent-
high’ section below) across all five trials. All individuals belonging to the top 1/3rd (high 
creative group: originality index > 0.65) and the bottom 1/3rd (low creative group: originality 
index < 0.59) of the sample were invited to take part in the three follow-up studies – a 
behavioral study, an ERP study, an fMRI study (discussed in this paper). A total of 41 
participants chose to participate in one or more of these follow up studies. Comparing the 
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high and low creative groups from the fMRI sample (n = 34) revealed that they did not differ 
in terms of age (t32 = 0.77, p = .445) or WST IQ (t32 = 0.77, p = .104).  None of the 
participants were taking medication at the time of measurement. All gave informed consent 
before participation and received either payment (€ 20) or course credits for their 
participation. The experimental standards of the study were approved by the Ethics 
Commission of the German Psychological Society (DGPs). 
 
Experimental Design 
As this study was conducted to replicate the findings in relation to creative conceptual 
expansion found in a previous fMRI study, the same experimental design was employed in 
the present fMRI study (Abraham, Pieritz, et al., 2012). The original study featured 2 x 2 
repeated measures factorial design with Task Type (divergent, control) and Cognitive 
Demand (high, low) as the factors (see Figure 1 for trial overview and examples of each 
condition – DivH, DivL, ConH, ConL). The experiment was conducted in one functional run1 
with 20 trials per condition and 8 resting baseline trials. The resting baseline trials (null 
events) were pseudo-randomly interspersed following every 8-12 condition trials. A ‘Start 
Cue’ and ‘End Cue’ always indicated the beginning and end of a condition trial, whereas a 
blank screen was presented during the resting baseline trials. All stimuli were presented 
visually in a pseudo-randomised order such that the frequency of all trial transition types was 
counterbalanced and all conditions occurred equally often in the first and second halves of 
the experiment. The experimental session lasted around 38 minutes (trial length = 25 secs).  
                                                
1 A single lengthy functional run has been used to examine research questions across a wide array of 
complex domains including mental time travel (Abraham, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2008), mental 
state reasoning (Abraham, Rakoczy, Werning, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010) and self-referential 
processing (Abraham, Kaufmann, et al., 2012).  
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The participants were given task instructions and performed a 10-minute practice session on a 
laptop prior to the imaging session where they were encountered a few trials of each task and 
understood how to perform each task. They were also informed that they would be asked to 
report the uses they generated in the scanner for each object (DivH: alternate uses task - 
AUT) as well as the objects they generated for each location (DivL: object location task - 
OLT) during the feedback session, which took place after the experimental session. They 
were made aware that the experimenter had a record on hand of how many objects and uses 
were generated per trial during the experiment and that these would be checked with the 
feedback report to examine performance accuracy.  
 
Experimental Tasks 
(a) Divergent-high (DH): The Alternate Uses task was used in this condition. Each trial began 
with the “Start Uses” Trial Cue, which was followed by a Task Cue that showed the word 
“Uses” coupled with an Object (e.g., Uses -> Shoe). There was no overlap in the stimuli used 
for the pre-study screening and the fMRI study. The Task Cue remained on the screen for the 
entire duration of the trial and indicated for which particular object different uses need to be 
generated. The object was different in each trial. Participants indicated with a button press as 
soon as they conceived of each new Use. The end of each trial was indicated with the “End 
Uses” Cue. The uses generated in the scanner were collected in a post-fMRI feedback 
session. The variables analysed further in relation to the DH task included ideational fluency 
(number of appropriate uses) and ideational originality (degree of uniqueness in use 
generation). The degree of uniqueness of the generated uses was calculated from the 
proportional weighting of each use by the frequency of its occurrence across the sample 
(Abraham, Pieritz, et al., 2012; Runco, Okuda, & Thurston, 1987) The same scoring protocol 
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(fluency and originality) for the AUT was undertaken in the pre-fMRI screening study and 
the fMRI study.  
 
(b) Divergent-low (DL): The Object-Location task was used in this condition. Each trial 
began with the “Start Objects” Trial Cue, which was followed by a Task Cue that showed the 
word “Objects” coupled with a Location (e.g., Objects -> Office). The Task Cue remained on 
the screen for the duration of the trial and indicated for which particular location different 
objects would have to be generated. The location was different in each trial. Participants 
indicated with a button press as soon as they thought of a new Object. The end of each trial 
was indicated with the “End Objects” Cue. The objects generated were collected in the post-
fMRI feedback session. The variable analysed further in relation to the DL task was the total 
score (number of appropriate objects).  
 
(c) Control-high (CH) & Control-low (CL) tasks: The n-back task was employed in these 
conditions with the 2-back for the CH task and the 1-back for the CL task. Each trial began 
with the “Start 2-back” Trial Cue (CH) or “Start 1-back” Trial Cue (CL). This was followed 
by presentation of a series of letters one after the other for the entire duration of the trial. 
Each letter was presented for 500ms with a 500ms pause between letters. Participants were 
required to keep track of the presented stimuli and indicate with a button press every time the 
currently presented letter was the same as the letter presented 2 letters before for the CH task, 
or 1 letter before for the CL task. The end of each trial was indicated with the “End 2-back” 
Cue (CH) or the “End 1-back” Cue (CL). As behavioral pilot studies indicated that 
participants generate approximately 4 uses per trial during the DH task and 8 objects per trial 
during the DL task, the CH and CL conditions were programmed to have 4 hits and 8 hits 
respectively within each trial.  
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(d) Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA): This measures creative ability (Goff & 
Torrance, 2002). Following the manual guidelines, two raters independently scored each 
participant’s response. Intra-class correlations (ICC) (model: 2-way random effects; value: 
average measures; type: consistency) were carried out to determine interrater reliability. The 
creativity level and creativity index were derived from the norm-referenced measures of 
fluency (ICC: 0.966 p < .001), originality (ICC: 0.915 p < .001), elaboration (ICC: 0.907 p < 
.001) and flexibility (ICC: 0.954 p < .001). Criterion-referenced indicators were not scored. 
The ATTA was administered in a separate follow-up behavioral study (see Footnote 3). 
MRI scanning procedure 
The MRI scanning procedure was kept identical to that of the original study (Abraham, 
Pieritz, et al., 2012). Functional and anatomical magnetic resonance imaging was carried out 
using a 1.5 Tesla whole-body tomography system (Siemens Symphony) with a standard head 
coil at the Bender Institute of Neuroimaging (BION) at the Justus Liebig University of 
Giessen. Participants lay supine in the scanner with their right index finger positioned on the 
button of a response box. Their hands were carefully stabilized and form-fitting cushions 
were used to prevent head, arm and hand movements. Earplugs were provided to the 
participants so that scanner noise would be attenuated. The structural image acquisition 
consisted of 160 T1-weighted sagittal images (MPRAGE, 1mm slice thickness). One run of 
functional imaging was carried out with a total of 902 volumes which were recorded using a 
T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging sequence (EPI) with 25 slices covering the 
whole brain (slice thickness = 5 mm; gap = 1 mm; descending slice order; TA = 100 ms; TE 
= 55 ms; TR = 2.5 s; flip angle = 90°; field of view = 192 mm x 192 mm; matrix size = 64 x 
64). The orientation of the axial slices was tilted to parallel the OFC tissue–bone transition to 
keep susceptibility artefacts to a minimum. The stimuli were visually projected onto a screen 
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at the end of the scanner (visual field = 18°) using an LCD projector (EPSON EMP-7250) 
and were viewed by the participants through a mirror mounted on the head coil. NBS 
Presentation® software was used to present the stimuli (resolution: 800 x 600).  
 
fMRI data analysis 
The protocol followed for the data preprocessing was also kept identical to that of the original 
study (Abraham, Pieritz, et al., 2012). The fMRI data were processed using the LIPSIA 
software package (Lohmann et al., 2001). This freeware contains tools for preprocessing, 
registration, statistical evaluation and presentation of fMRI data. Functional data were first 
motion-corrected using a matching metric based on linear correlation. To correct for the 
temporal offset between the slices acquired in one scan, a sinc-interpolation based on the 
Nyquist-Shannon-Theorem was applied. Low-frequency signal changes and baseline drifts 
were removed using a temporal highpass filter with a cut-off frequency of 1/150 Hz. Spatial 
smoothing was performed with a Gaussian filter of 8 mm FWHM. The functional data were 
registered to the anatomical data via a rigid linear registration with 6 degrees of freedom (3 
rotational, 3 translational) and were then normalized to the Talairach standard space. The 
normalized parameters were then used to transform the functional slices using trilinear 
interpolation, thus generating output data with a spatial resolution of 3x3x3 mm (voxel size: 
27 mm3).  
 
The statistical evaluation was based on a least-squares estimation using the general linear 
model for serially autocorrelated observations (Friston et al., 1994; Worsley & Friston, 
1995). The design matrix used for modelling the data consisted of onset vectors each the four 
experimental conditions with an additional onset vector for null events or rest trials. Every 
trial of each condition was associated with several responses over the 20-second response 
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period (see Table 1) (3-5 responses for DH as indicated by DH fluency [in scanner], and 7-9 
responses for DL as indicated by DL total [in scanner]). The onsets for the experimental 
conditions were recorded as beginning 1 second before each response (e.g., DH: each 
generated use in each trial). This is because the responses in the experiment indicated either a 
hit in the case of the 2-back (CH) or 1-back (CL) tasks, or the generation of a new use (DH) 
or object (DL) in the divergent thinking tasks. The mental operations of interest were 
therefore taking place just prior to the generation of the response. The design matrix was 
generated with a boxcar function, convolved with the hemodynamic response function. Brain 
activations were analyzed in an event-related design, time-locked to the responses. The 
model equation, including the observation data, the design matrix, and the error term, was 
convolved with a Gaussian kernel dispersion of 4 sec FWHM to account for the temporal 
autocorrelation (Worsley & Friston, 1995). Contrast images or beta value estimates of the 
raw-score differences between specified conditions were generated for each participant. The 
Talairach Atlas was used to map the location of brain activity to brain regions (Talairach & 
Tournoux, 1988). 
 
(a) Replication of findings pertaining to creative conceptual expansion2: The steps followed 
for this part of the data analysis was the same as that of the original study (Abraham, Pieritz, 
et al., 2012). As all individual functional data sets were aligned to the same stereotactic 
reference space, the single-subject contrast images were entered into a second-level random-
effects analysis for each of the contrasts. One-sample t tests were employed for the group 
                                                
2 While the primary focus in the original Abraham, Pieritz et al. (2012) paper was on the creative 
conceptual expansion contrast, two other contrasts of interest were also carried out to assess 
divergent thinking (DH, DL > controls CH, CL) and cognitive control (CH > CL). This was the 
reason for including the control low demand task (CL) within the experimental design.   
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analyses across the contrast images of all subjects, which indicated whether observed 
differences between conditions were significantly distinct from zero. t values were 
subsequently transformed into z scores. The results were corrected for multiple comparisons 
using double thresholding, a combination of single voxel probability thresholding on one 
hand (here z > 3.09, p < .001), and cluster-size and cluster-z-value thresholding on the other 
(here p < .01), which is computed using Monte-Carlo simulations (Lohmann, Neumann, 
Muller, Lepsien, & Turner, 2008). To uncover the brain correlates of conceptual expansion, 
an inclusive mask analysis was carried out where the statistic parametric map of the random-
effects analysis of the divergent-high versus control-high contrast (DH > CH) was used as an 
inclusive mask in the random-effects analysis of the divergent-high versus divergent-low 
contrast (DH > DL) contrast. The findings that resulted from this inclusive masked analysis 
indicate which brain areas were significantly activated during DH relative to DL, but only if 
the same regions were also more highly activated during DH relative to CH. 
 
(b) Assessing individual differences in relation to creative conceptual expansion: The single-
subject contrast images were entered into a second-level Bayesian statistical analysis for each 
of the contrasts (Neumann & Lohmann, 2003). The parameter estimates obtained from the 
general linear model for single subjects are used to calculate posterior probability maps and 
maps of the effect size for the contrasts of interest. This Bayesian statistical method is more 
robust against outliers in comparison to conventional analyses based on t statistics as the 
influence of individual subjects on groups statistics is weighted by the within-subject 
variability. As this technique has been shown to be highly reliable when applied to different 
groups of subjects (Thirion et al., 2007), it has been commonly employed in studies where 
between-group comparisons are the focus (e.g., Abraham, Kaufmann, et al., 2012; Abraham, 
Thybusch, Pieritz, & Hermann, 2014; Albrecht, Volz, Sutter, Laibson, & Cramon, 2011; 
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Klein et al., 2007). It provides estimates for, not only the size of an effect of interest, but also 
the probability for that effect to occur in the population. It also overcomes some of the 
common problems of null hypothesis significance tests such as the need to correct for 
multiple comparisons (Neumann & Lohmann, 2003).  
 
The output of the Bayesian second-level analysis is a probability map, which shows the 
probability that the contrast is greater than zero. Group differences (high creative versus low 
creative) were carried out using Bayesian analyses. The Bayesian second-level probability 
maps for the two groups were used as the input. The output of this between-groups analysis is 
a probability map which shows the probability for that particular contrast to be larger in one 
group relative to the other group. Group differences were analysed for the following 
contrasts: (a) Divergent-High (DH) > Divergent-Low (DL), (b) Divergent (DH) > Control 
(CH). For the contrasts related to each group, inclusive masks were employed to limit the 
regions of activation to those specific to that creativity group. So, for instance, in the high 
creative > low creative between-subjects contrast of DH > DL, the high creative within-group 
contrast (high creative only: DH > DL) was used as an inclusive mask, and in the high 
creative > low creative between-subjects contrast of DH > CH, the high creative within-group 
contrast (high creative only: DH > CH) was used as an inclusive mask. To determine which 
regions of the brain show group differences that are specific to conceptual expansion, a 
conjunction analysis [(DH > DL) & (DH > CH)] of the preceding contrasts were carried out 
for each group. There are no standard ‘thresholds’ that indicate the significance of a result 
within the framework of Bayesian statistics3. As values of over 99% are held to indicate a 
high probability of activation, a significance threshold of 99.5% was applied for all Bayesian 
                                                
3 http://static.cbs.mpg.de/lipsia/vbayes/index.html 
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analyses in the current study with a minimum cluster size of 10 or more voxels (270 cubic 
mm).  
 
General information on differences between frequentist approaches (null hypothesis 
significance testing) and Bayesian approaches with regard to the theoretical assumptions, the 
multiple comparisons problems and the associated advantages/disadvantages of each 
approach can be found in the published literature (Gelman, Hill, & Yajima, 2012; Han & 
Park, 2018; Wagenmakers et al., 2017) and on online forums4.  
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Behavioral Findings 
The statistical analyses were run using the JASP open source project (JASP Team, 2017). As 
participants completed the ATTA in a follow-up behavioral study (n=27)5, it was possible to 
evaluate the consistency in their creative performance across three different testing sessions 
as well as the reliability of performance on the AUT on two separate occasions with different 
                                                
4 A selection of three useful blogs: (i) http://andrewgelman.com/2016/08/22/bayesian-inference-
completely-solves-the-multiple-comparisons-problem/, (ii) 
http://thestatsgeek.com/2016/11/18/frequentists-should-more-often-consider-using-bayesian-
methods/, and (iii) http://bayesfactor.blogspot.co.uk/2015/01/multiple-comparisons-with-
bayesfactor-1.html  
5 As noted in the Methods Section, following the screening study, participants were invited to 
participate in three follow-up studies: an fMRI study (the focus of this paper), an EEG study and a 
behavioral study. The ATTA was one of the measures used in the behavioral study. As not all the 
participants from the fMRI study also participated in the behavioral study, the sample size in 
relation to the ATTA variables are lower. 
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objects (5 in the screening study and 20 in the fMRI study). As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, 
while the groups were not significantly differentiable in the number of responses generated in 
the divergent low demand object location task, as the high creative group demonstrated 
higher ideational originality (p = .01, d = 0.81) than the low creative group in the divergent 
high demand alternate uses task, but not significantly higher ideational fluency.  
 
In the pre-fMRI screening study though, the high creative group demonstrated both higher 
originality (p < .001, d = 3.44) and higher fluency (p < .001, d = 2.73) than the low creative 
group. So how can these discrepant findings in relation to ideational fluency across the two 
AUT testing sessions be best explained? One key factor that may have contributed to the 
difference in the findings is the differing trial lengths of the AUT in each study. The pre-
fMRI screening was a behavioral study where the participants had 2 minutes per item to 
generate as many uses as possible. In the fMRI study, in contrast, the participants had only 20 
seconds per item, posing a temporal limit on the extent of fluency that is possible to generate 
in that context.   
 
In addition, the two groups were also significantly different in terms of their ATTA 
performance with the high creative group performing better than the low creative group on 
the ATTA originality measure (p = .04, d = 0.7) as well as the ATTA creativity level (p = .05, 
d = 0.65). Moreover, correlational analyses between these creativity-relevant variables have 
indicated that Ideational Originality (DH) on the AUT task is significantly positively 
correlated with four relevant measures within the ATTA – fluency, originality, creativity 
index and creativity level, as well as with ideational originality and ideational fluency on the 
AUT used during the screening session (Table 3). This speaks for the validity of the 
creativity construct as well as reliability in the levels of performance across testing sessions. 
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This also speaks for the consistent differences between the high and low creative groups in 
their creative ability as measured by two different divergent thinking tasks.  
 
Although there were no group differences in relation to IQ scores, linear regression analyses 
were carried out as a check to verify whether performance on the AUT task was significantly 
predicted by IQ. The findings revealed no evidence for the same given non-significant 
regression equations for DH fluency (F1, 32=1.91, p = .18 with an R2 of 0.056) and DH 
originality (F1, 32=0.53, p = .47 with an R2 of 0.016).  
 
As a check the number of responses generated during the fMRI testing session (in the 
scanner) and after the testing session (in the post-fMRI feedback session) were compared for 
the divergent thinking tasks. In line with the previous findings (Abraham, Pieritz, et al., 
2012), the number of responses generated in the scanner (DH: Mean = 4.02, SD = 1.51; DL: 
Mean = 7.89, SD = 2.2) was higher than the number of responses generated after the 
scanning session (DH: Mean = 3.63, SD = 1.02; DL: Mean = 7.35, SD = 2.03) for both the 
alternate uses task (DH: t33 = 2.08, p = .045) and the object location task (DL: t33 = 6.91, p 
< .001). This reduction in responses was attributed to forgetting in the previous study and the 
same interpretation is put forward as a possible explanation in the current study. No 
significant differences were found between the high and low creative groups in relation to the 
same (Table 2).  
 
fMRI Findings: Replication  
The first objective of this paper was to replicate the findings reported in the original study by 
Abraham et al. (2012) in relation to creative conceptual expansion. In that study, a novel 
experimental paradigm was designed to evaluate conceptual expansion by having subjects 
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carry out the alternate uses task (DH) and compare the brain activity generated during that 
task with another task of divergent thinking, the object location task (DL). The latter did not 
necessitate the expansion of conceptual boundaries or creative idea generation but it did 
involve access to conceptual or semantic knowledge and it was open-ended with regard to the 
number of responses that could be given when undertaking the task. In order to rule out the 
possibility that the differences between the patterns brain activity seen when performing the 
alternate uses task and object location task were not merely attributable to higher cognitive 
demands posed in the former case, cognitive control tasks that did not involve accessing 
semantic knowledge were also employed. The contrast between the brain activity patterns 
generated during the alternate uses task compared to that of the highly demanding 2-back 
working memory task was used as inclusive mask. In this way, the only brain regions that 
were more strongly engaged during the alternate uses task compared to the 2-back working 
memory task would meet the threshold to allow warrant consideration in the contrast between 
the alternate uses task (DH) and the object location task (DL). 
 
The findings of the study of this analysis (contrast: DH > DL with inclusive mask DH > CH) 
are presented in Table 4. In the original study, the brain regions that were predicted to 
instrumental for creative conceptual expansion were the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG: BA 
45 and 47), the temporal pole (TP: BA 38) and the lateral frontal pole (FP: BA 10), given the 
well-documented role ascribed to these regions in semantic retrieval, semantic storage and 
relational integration (Badre & Wagner, 2007; Bookheimer, 2002; Lau et al., 2008; Patterson 
et al., 2007; Ramnani & Owen, 2004; Thompson-Schill, 2003; Wendelken et al., 2008). All 
of these regions were expected to be engaged during creative conceptual expansion as the 
task involves dynamic access and manipulation of semantic association from our long-term 
knowledge stores in order to forge novel relations between concepts.  
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As shown in Table 4 and Figure 2, the involvement of these regions during conceptual 
expansion was confirmed in the present fMRI study. Indeed, the extent of brain activity was 
strikingly similar to that of the original study (Abraham, Pieritz, et al., 2012). Moreover, 
several other brain regions (for which no a priori hypotheses were put forward) that were 
significantly activated during creative conceptual expansion in the original study were also 
found in the current study. These include posterior regions in the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 
44), the middle frontal gyrus (BA 8), the anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24), dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex (BA 8, 9, 6), and the inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) as well as regions of 
the basal ganglia (putamen, globus pallidus). Just as in the original study, the entire activation 
pattern across the brain was more strongly lateralized to the left hemisphere (Table 4).  
 
Other relevant brain regions that have newly emerged in the current study as being relevant to 
creative conceptual expansion are the right IFG (BA 45), the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and 
the hippocampus (Figure 2). The grounds to consider these regions as being potentially 
significant to the discussion of conceptual expansion are two-fold. First, the current sample (n 
=34) is larger than that of the original study (n =19). So the interpretations of the findings can 
be offered with cautious confidence. Secondly, these regions have been discussed in relation 
to mental operations that are relevant for creativity, such as coarse coding in lexical 
processing (right hemisphere: Jung-Beeman, 2005), inhibitory control (right IFG: Aron et al., 
2014), proactive and predictive processing (OFC: Bar, 2007) and declarative memory 
operations (hippocampus: Duff, Kurczek, Rubin, Cohen, & Tranel, 2013). Future 
investigations of different facets of creative cognition (Finke et al., 1996), like conceptual 
expansion, can look to generate designs to tap the potential roles played by such structures in 
facilitating creative idea generation.  
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fMRI Findings: Individual Differences  
The lack of contemporary neuroscientific theories to explain the brain basis of individual 
differences in creativity means that investigations of the same are largely explorative. 
However, as expounded in the Introduction of this paper, classic theoretical accounts that 
were steeped in tradition of experimental psychology and sought to uncover information 
processing biases that explain individual differences in creativity (Martindale, 1999; 
Mednick, 1962; Mendelsohn, 1974) are very useful in generating postulations concerning 
individual differences in creative neurocognition. This is because those early insights can be 
combined with our current knowledge of neurocognitive basis of creativity and newer 
frameworks that have been proposed to explain the information processing mechanisms that 
underlie the same (Abraham, 2014; Beaty et al., 2016; Dietrich & Haider, 2016; Jung et al., 
2013). Indeed, allusions to the adoption of such an approach were even made more than a 
decade ago (Abraham & Windmann, 2007: pp 39, 46). The immense advantage of the present 
day is that far more is known about cognitive and brain function from which to make 
informed postulations.  
 
If individual differences in creative conceptual expansion are attributable to flat associative 
hierarchies in one’s conceptual knowledge (Mednick, 1962), then differentiated activations in 
regions of the semantic cognition brain network involved in the access and storage of 
knowledge (Binder & Desai, 2011), such as the temporal pole (Patterson et al., 2007) and the 
posterior middle temporal gyrus (Lau et al., 2008) would be expected. On the other hand, if 
individual differences in creative conceptual expansion are instead attributable to defocused 
attention (Mendelsohn, 1974), regions of the semantic cognition network such as the 
posterior middle temporal gyrus (Lau et al., 2008) and the lateral inferior frontal gyrus (Badre 
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& Wagner, 2007) would be implicated as they are involved in the retrieval conceptual 
knowledge and so would working memory relevant regions, such as the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (du Boisgueheneuc et al., 2006) as the manipulation of information in one’s 
stream of consciousness is inherent in such conceptualizations. The third alternative points to 
the role of inhibitory control in creative ideation (Martindale, 1999), which points of regions 
of the CEN such as the basal ganglia and the right inferior frontal gyrus being selectively 
responsive during creative conceptual expansion (Aron et al., 2014; Hampshire & Sharp, 
2015; Schall et al., 2017).  
 
It must be emphasized here that the current study is certainly not designed to be a test of any 
of these theories. These influential ideas merely constitute well-informed sources from which 
to derive useful interpretations when exploring the patterns of findings associated with 
individual differences in creative conceptual expansion.   
 
The findings of the analyses to evaluate individual differences in creative conceptual 
expansion (contrast: conjunction of DH > DL and DH > CH) are presented in Table 5. So 
what was assessed was brain activity pattern that was selectively engaged when performing 
the DH alternate uses task relative to both the DL object location task and the CH 2-back 
working memory task. There were no significant findings in relation to the brain activity 
generated by the low creative group relative to the high creative group in creative conceptual 
expansion. In contrast, several brain regions were engaged the high creative group relative to 
the low creative group during creative conceptual expansion. These included the anterior 
lateral inferior frontal gyrus in the left hemisphere (BA 45, 47) and the right hemisphere (BA 
45) as well as the temporal pole (BA 38) and the posterior middle temporal gyrus (BA 37). 
The regions are commonly activated as part of the semantic cognition brain network (Binder 
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& Desai, 2011) and are involved in the access and storage of conceptual knowledge (Lau et 
al., 2008). This would imply that highly creative people expend greater neural resources 
towards such semantic operations when undertaking the alternate uses task and engaging in 
conceptual expansion. This pattern of findings cannot be attributed to differences in the 
number of generated responses as the high and low creative groups were not significantly 
different on that count. If permitted to postulate further, this pattern of findings would be in 
line with the theoretical frameworks of individual differences in creative thinking as 
espoused by both Mednick (flat associative hierarchies) and Mendelssohn (defocused 
attention). Please note though that the findings cannot be taken as evidence against the 
theoretical framework of Martindale (cognitive disinhibition) as the experimental paradigm 
was not designed as a test of proof between the theories.  
 
Other relevant brain regions that were most strongly engaged in the high creative group 
compared to the low creative group during conceptual expansion include the insula and the 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), core regions of the salience network. Increasingly 
more neuroimaging studies draw on brain network based interpretations to explain findings. 
Many stress the different roles played by the default mode brain network (DMN) and the 
central executive brain network (CEN) in facilitating selective aspects of creative thinking 
(Beaty et al., 2015; Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman, & Christoff, 2012; Jung et al., 2013; Limb & 
Braun, 2008). Apart from a few regions like the temporal pole (DMN region) and the lateral 
IFG (CEN region), the evidence from the present study does not point to a special role played 
by either the wider set of regions of the DMN or the CEN in creative conceptual expansion. 
However, this could be a result of the type of paradigm (event-related) and analyses 
(Bayesian) employed in the current study as empirical studies that lean on this type of 
network based interpretation typically feature different phases of creative ideation (generate 
 25 
versus evaluate: Ellamil et al., 2012) and connectivity based analyses (resting state: Beaty et 
al., 2014). Indeed, given the mounting evidence that suggests that the salience network 
modulates the dynamic switching between the endogenously-mediated or internally-directed 
DMN and the exogenously-driven or externally-directed CEN (Menon, 2015; Uddin, 2015), 
creativity researchers also emphasize the role of the salience network, the core regions of 
which include the anterior insula and the dorsal ACC, in orchestrating the interplay between 
the processing of DMN and CEN during creative ideation (Beaty et al., 2015; Heinonen et al., 
2016).  
 
While the pattern of findings in the present study cannot be used to support or reject the brain 
network interplay idea, the clear involvement of the salience network in creative conceptual 
expansion raises interesting questions about its specific role in this context. Abundant 
research has indicated that, “brain signals involved in conflict monitoring, interoceptive–
autonomic, and reward processing areas” are integrated “into a common ‘salience network’” 
(Menon, 2011: 457).  The point concerning interoceptive awareness may be the focal one as 
the anterior superior temporal gyrus (aSTG), a region that is commonly discussed in the 
experience of insight during creative problem solving (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004), was also 
engaged in the present study as a function of individual differences in conceptual expansion. 
The fact that the phenomenology of insight involves a sudden awareness of a reaching a 
solution following an impasse fits well with the interpretation of the role of the salience 
network in interoceptive awareness. This is one of several potential directions of exploration 
of the individual differences in conceptual expansion and other facets of creative cognition. 
 
Interpreting the Findings in Relation to those Following Other Approaches 
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How can the current findings on the neural basis of individual differences in conceptual 
expansion be aligned to the extant literature on individual differences in creativity? This is 
more challenging than one might expect given than the focus in the present study follows a 
local approach whereas neuroimaging research on creativity is increasingly shifting to the 
norm of global approaches to understanding creative neurocognition where the focus is on 
uncovering the dynamics of the interactions between large-scale networks (Abraham, in 
press). Several studies have examined the brain basis of individual differences in creativity 
(e.g., Aberg, Doell, & Schwartz, 2016; Jung et al., 2010; Takeuchi et al., 2010a, 2010b). For 
instance, a well designed recent comparison of brain activity of high and low creative 
individuals using task-based fMRI and task-free resting state connectivity analyses revealed 
heightened functional connections between hub regions of the default mode network 
(posterior cingulate), the central executive network (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and the 
salience network (anterior insula) (Beaty et al., 2018). Global approaches are also being 
applied at the level of behavioral responses. A good example of this is the fascinating finding 
of differences in the structure of semantic memory networks as a function of individual 
differences in creative ability such that high creative individuals are characterised by more 
flexible networks which are more robust to network percolation or the removal of below 
threshold low strength links (Kenett et al., 2018).  
 
These important studies follow a global approach and are very useful in delivering us key 
insights about the big picture regarding the creative mind. However, it is not straightforward 
to infer how these findings relate to the understanding of the information processing 
mechanisms underlying conceptual expansion compared to analogical reasoning, for instance, 
as these require analyses through the lends of a local process-based approach. Unfortunately, 
while the local approach has been used extensively to uncover the neural basis of relevant 
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creative operations such as analogical reasoning (Green, Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray, & 
Dunbar, 2012), creative imagery (Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, & Dandekar, 2012), overcoming 
knowledge constraints (Abraham, Beudt, et al., 2012), metaphor processing (Mashal, Faust, 
Hendler, & Jung-Beeman, 2007), improvisation (Limb & Braun, 2008) and insight (Kounios 
& Beeman, 2014), explorations of individual differences in relation to the same are rare (e.g., 
Bendetowicz, Urbanski, Aichelburg, Levy, & Volle, 2017). So there is much that remains to 
be done in creativity research that follows a local approach. Moreover, if investigations 
following global approaches saw the inclusion of multiple measures of creative cognition (a 
valuable recommendation to improve validity, see Cropley, 2000; Kim, 2006), the differences 
in the functional connectivity analyses, for instance, in relation to the various measures would 
be highly informative for the local approach and, as a consequence, would aid us in further 
understanding the mechanisms underlying creative thinking in all its complexity. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
The primary limitation of the study is that the sample only included female participants. This 
was due to logistical issues and the necessity to not increase the complexity of the 
experimental design especially given the explorative nature of the follow-up study on 
individual differences in creative conceptual expansion. The primary logistical issue is that 
students who volunteer to participate in such studies mostly stem from the Faculty of 
Psychology where the proportion of female students is far higher than male students. It was 
anticipated that the nature of pre-fMRI behavioral screening study to identify and recruit high 
and low creative ability individuals would render it very challenging to also have comparable 
number of males and females in each group, all of whom would be willing to participate in an 
fMRI study, an EEG study and a behavioral study (the latter two are not discussed in this 
paper). As the study was conceived of with the explicit aim of carrying out an individual 
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differences based analysis (high creative group versus low creative group), the introduction 
of yet another variable that would need to be controlled for, especially given that there some 
gender-based differences in brain structure and function have been reported in relation to 
creativity (Abraham et al., 2014; Ryman et al., 2014). These are, however, very early days in 
the neuroscientific study of gender differences in creativity. So it is not possible to infer how 
the findings reported herein may or may not be impacted by having assessed creative 
conceptual expansion only in women.  However, any cause for concern should be alleviated 
by the strong parallels in the findings of the original study and the present study with 
reference to the brain correlates of creative conceptual expansion. 
 
Post-fMRI difficulty ratings for the conditions, which were part of the behavioural measures 
in the Abraham et al. (2012) study, were not included in the present study. We did not have 
any expectations with reference to group based differences in relation to how cognitive 
demanding the different conditions were experienced to be. While differences between the 
high and low creative groups in the number of responses generated in the divergent high 
demand (DH fluency) and divergent low demand (DL total score) were not significant, it 
cannot be assumed that both these conditions were experienced as equivalently demanding by 
both groups. This therefore constitutes a shortcoming of the current study. 
  
Conclusions 
This study was designed to answer two questions. The first was whether it could replicate the 
findings in relation to the brain basis of creative conceptual expansion and the second was to 
uncover brain basis of individual differences in creative conceptual expansion. The 
replication of the original findings was successful. Just as in the original study, brain regions 
that were selectively engaged during creative conceptual expansion included the left anterior 
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inferior frontal gyrus, the temporal poles and the lateral frontopolar cortex, areas that play a 
significant role in the retention, retrieval and relational integration of semantic information. 
The assessment of the second question revealed that regions involved in the access and 
storage of semantic knowledge such as the anterior inferior frontal gyrus, the temporal poles 
and the posterior middle temporal gyrus were more strongly engaged in the high creative 
group compared to the low creative group. The responsiveness of the salience network during 
creative conceptual expansion also differentiates the high creative group from the low 
creative group.   
 
The process of conceptual expansion was the subject of the current paper and key insights 
were derived regarding the brain basis of conceptual expansion and further efforts will be 
necessary to explore the dynamics of conceptual expansion as well as examine other relevant 
mental operations in creativity such as creative imagery and constraints posed by recently 
activated knowledge in the generation of original responses (Abraham & Windmann, 2007). 
Some empirically and theoretically informed frameworks have been proposed to explain 
select differences in the patterns of brain engagement as a function of individual differences 
in multiple aspects of creative cognition (e.g., Abraham, 2014; Beaty, 2015). Such an 
undertaking is imperative to ensure that the field of creativity garners the same degree of 
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Figure 1. A schematic diagram of the trial events and examples of the different conditions 
 
Figure 2. The brain correlates of creative conceptual expansion across all participants. A: 
Inferior frontal gyrus, temporal pole | B: Orbitofrontal cortex | C: Hippocampus | D: 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.   
 
Figure 3. The brain correlates of individual difference in creative conceptual expansion. The 
high creative group showed significant engagement of the A: Inferior frontal gyrus | B: 
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Table 1. Descriptive data (mean, standard deviation, standard error) across experimental measures for the low and high creative 
groups.  
 Measures Group  N       Mean        SD        SE  
Screening study – Ideational Fluency  low creative   15   4.067   0.675   0.174   
    high creative   19   7.168   1.391   0.319   
Screening study – Ideational Originality  low creative   15   0.551   0.049   0.013   
    high creative   19   0.699   0.037   0.009   
ATTA Fluency  low creative   12   16.250   2.127   0.614   
    high creative   15   16.933   2.235   0.577   
ATTA Originality  low creative   12   14.833   2.406   0.694   
    high creative   15   16.300   1.791   0.462   
ATTA Elaboration  low creative   12   18.458   1.033   0.298   
    high creative   15   18.367   1.631   0.421   
ATTA Flexibility  low creative   12   15.292   1.339   0.387   
    high creative   15   15.600   2.339   0.604   
ATTA Creativity Index  low creative   12   73.875   8.945   2.582   
    high creative   15   77.833   9.496   2.452   
ATTA Creativity Level  low creative   12   4.500   1.314   0.379   
    high creative   15   5.433   1.534   0.396   
fMRI study – Ideational Originality (DH)  low creative   15   0.595   0.064   0.016   
    high creative   19   0.655   0.081   0.019   
fMRI study – Ideational Fluency (DH)  low creative   15   3.391   0.971   0.251   
    high creative   19   3.825   1.043   0.239   
fMRI study – Divergent Low Demand (DL): Total  low creative   15   6.773   1.808   0.467   
    high creative   19   7.803   2.123   0.487   
fMRI study – Ideational Fluency (DH) [in scanner]  low creative   15   3.624   0.975   0.252   
    high creative   19   4.325   1.791   0.411   
fMRI study – Divergent Low Demand (DL): Total [in scanner]  low creative   15   7.377   1.780   0.460   
    high creative   19   8.287   2.449   0.562   
  
Abbreviations.  ATTA – Abbreviated Torrance Tests for Adults; DH – Divergent High Demand (Alternate Uses Task); DL – Divergent Low Demand (Object 
Location Task) 
Table 2. Findings from independent samples t-tests (low creative group versus high creative group) that evaluated the relations 
between all creativity measures across testing sessions 
  
 Measures t  df  p  Cohen's d  
Screening study – Ideational Fluency   -7.915   32   < .001  ᵃ  -2.734   
Screening study – Ideational Originality  -9.970   32   < .001   -3.443   
ATTA Fluency   -0.806   25   0.21   -0.312   
ATTA Originality   -1.817   25   0.04   -0.704   
ATTA Elaboration   0.169   25   0.57   0.066   
ATTA Flexibility   -0.406   25   0.34  ᵃ  -0.157   
ATTA Creativity Index   -1.104   25   0.14   -0.428   
ATTA Creativity Level  -1.672   25   0.05   -0.648   
fMRI study – Ideational Originality (DH)  -2.350   32   0.01   -0.812   
fMRI study – Ideational Fluency (DH)  -1.243   32   0.11   -0.429   
fMRI study – Divergent Low Demand (DL): Total  -1.497   32   0.07   -0.517   
fMRI study – Ideational Fluency (DH) [in scanner]  -1.363  32  0.09  -0.471  
fMRI study – Divergent Low Demand (DL): Total [in scanner]  -1.208  32  0.12  -0.417  
 Note.  Student's T-Test.  
Note.  For all tests, the alternative hypothesis specifies that group low creative is less than group high creative.  
ᵃ Levene's test is significant (p < .05), suggesting a violation of the equal variance assumption  
 






Table 3. Correlation Matrix (Pearson correlation) with all creativity-relevant variables   
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fMRI DH AUT Fluency  
 r   0.839  ***  —                                    
p-value   < .001   —                                    
fMRI DL OLT Total   
 r   0.631  ***  0.659  ***  —                                
p-value   < .001   < .001   —                                
BehScr AUT Fluency   
r   0.516  **  0.447  **  0.358  *  —                            
p-value   0.002   0.008   0.038   —                            
BehScr AUT Originality   
 r   0.378  *  0.222   0.240   0.847  ***  —                        
p-value   0.028   0.207   0.172   < .001   —                        
ATTA Fluency   
 r   0.442  *  0.456  *  0.247   0.447  *  0.346   —                    
p-value   0.021   0.017   0.214   0.019   0.077   —                    
ATTA Originality   
 r   0.487  *  0.474  *  0.406  *  0.437  *  0.440  *  0.720  ***  —                
p-value   0.010   0.012   0.036   0.023   0.022   < .001   —                
ATTA Elaboration  
 r   0.276   0.363   0.206   0.149   0.009   0.272   0.407  *  —            
p-value   0.164   0.063   0.304   0.458   0.965   0.171   0.035   —            
ATTA Flexibility   
 r   0.194   0.261   0.101   0.015   -0.083   0.164   0.061   0.350   —        
p-value   0.332   0.189   0.617   0.942   0.682   0.414   0.763   0.073   —        
ATTA creativity index   
 r   0.527  **  0.616  ***  0.394  *  0.381   0.270   0.758  ***  0.769  ***  0.679  ***  0.489  **  —    
p-value   0.005   < .001   0.042   0.050   0.174   < .001   < .001   < .001   0.010   —    
ATTA creativity level  
 r   0.556  **  0.608  ***  0.416  *  0.504  **  0.378   0.795  ***  0.765  ***  0.654  ***  0.461  *  0.976  ***   
p-value   0.003   < .001   0.031   0.007   0.052   < .001   < .001   < .001   0.015   < .001    
 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
Abbreviations.  ATTA – Abbreviated Torrance Tests for Adults; AUT – Alternate Uses Task; BehScr – Behavioral Screening; DH – Divergent High Demand; 
DL – Divergent Low Demand; Elab – Elaboration; Flex – Flexibility; OLT – Object Location Task; Orig - Originality 
Table 4. Brain Correlates of Creative Conceptual Expansion [DH alternate uses task > DL object location task contrast (with 
inclusive mask: DH alternate uses task > CH 2-back task contrast)]. Information provided below includes approximate anatomical 
specification, Talairach coordinates, maximum Z value and volume (cubic mm) of the significantly activated areas (l.m.: local 
maxima within each volume). The results were corrected for whole brain multiple comparisons at the cluster level (p < .01).  
Area x y z BA mm3 z-max 
Lateral IFG, MFG, TP, OFC, Hipp -49 6 9 44-47,10,38  60183 6.44 
Lateral IFG -43 18 15 45, 44 l.m. 6.91 
Posterior insula -34 -9 3  l.m. 4.73 
Putamen  -13 3 9  l.m. 5.00 
Globus pallidus -13 -9 -3  l.m. 5.04 
Globus pallidus 14 -9 -3  l.m. 4.39 
Thalamus -4 -18 9  l.m. 4.64 
Thalamus -19 -30 0  l.m. 4.60 
Lateral IFG 50 27 6 45 621 4.77 
Dorsomedial PFC, ACC -7 21 45 8, 9, 24  17280 5.61 
Dorsomedial PFC -4 12 54 8, 6 l.m. 5.38 
Dorsomedial PFC -13 42 30 9 l.m. 4.42 
ACC -1 -6 36 24 l.m. 4.65 
SFG, MFG -31 12 42 8, 46 l.m. 4.39 
Caudate nucleus 14 3 12  l.m. 5.27 
Inferior Parietal Lobe -55 -33 39 40 5805 6.66 
ITG, MTG, Cerebellum -46 -69 -6  13149 6.62 
Occipital Lobe -25 -99 -6  l.m. 5.53 
Thalamus  14 -9 -3  999 4.39 
Cerebellum, Occipital Lobe 23 -72 -24  51165 6.44 
Cerebellum 38 -60 -36  l.m. 5.36 
Occipital Lobe 11 -87 9  l.m. 5.24 
Occipital Lobe -7 -90 9  l.m. 5.07 
Table 5. Brain Correlates of Individual Differences in Creative Conceptual Expansion [Conjunction of (a) DH alternate uses task > 
DL object location task contrast AND (b) DH alternate uses task > CH 2-back task contrast]. Information provided below includes 
approximate anatomical specification, Talairach coordinates, max probability (Prob) and volume (cubic mm) of the significantly 
activated areas. The minimum threshold was set at 99.5% probability (Bayesian) with a minimum cluster size more than 10 voxels 
(270 cubic mm).  
Area x y z BA mm3 Prob 
 
High Creative Group > Low Creative Group: Creative Conceptual Expansion 
 
Lateral IFG -46 30 18 45, 47 1350 100 
Lateral IFG -28 18 -9 47 l.m. 99.62 
Lateral IFG 44 27 3 45 351 100 
Insula -34 -12 12  1080 99.99 
Dorsal ACC -1 -9 33 24 513 99.99 
Temporal Pole -37 9 -12 38 1134 99.96 
Anterior STG -49 3 0 22 l.m. 99.91 
Posterior MTG -49 -66 3 37 1782 100 
Orbital gyrus -40 -60 0 19 l.m. 99.99 
Postcentral gyrus -52 -27 33 2 1431 100 
Supramarginal gyrus -58 -42 33 40 l.m. 99.99 
Occipital lobe - cuneus -1 -87 3 17 1080 99.98 
Occipital Gyrus 23 -87 0 18, 19 918 99.98 
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